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Abstract
 This essay examines the daily lives of Young Communist League (Komsomol) 
cadres in the 1920s and argues that their ability to establish local authority through 
consent was often undermined by their everyday conditions. The article addresses 
the emergence of the Komsomol’s nomenklatura and cadre appointment system after 
the Russian civil war, cadre workload, working conditions, health, attitudes, and 
the Komsomol leadership’s efforts to subordinate cadre malfeasance and corruption 
through public scandal. The article demonstrates that without a sturdy material base 
upon which to generate consent, local Komsomol cadres often relied on domination 
to exert their authority over their rank-and-file members and to some extent the local 
population. This reliance ultimately perpetuated itself. The more cadres employed 
coercion, the more the means of consent atrophied, which led them to turn time and 
again to domination. The use of domination over consent had grave implications on 
the nature of Bolshevik rule. Often Komsomol cadres were the only representative 
of the Soviet state in rural localities, and their methods of garnering authority were 
representative of prevailing trends of Bolshevik governance throughout the 1920s.
Profiles in Exhaustion and Pomposity: The Everyday Life of 
Komsomol Cadres in the 1920s
Throughout the 1920s, the Young Communist League (Komsomol) rapidly 
spread across the Soviet Union. Although seemingly a fragmented patchwork, the 
Komsomol was tied together by an army of cadres that staffed the League’s central, 
provincial, and district committees and cell bureaus. These human knots were vital 
to the organization’s day-to-day local functioning. Perhaps more importantly, they 
often served as the sole representatives of the Soviet state and, by extension, the 
emerging socialist system. As Nikolai Chaplin, who would later become General 
Secretary of the Komsomol, stated at the Fourth Komsomol Congress in 1921, cadres 
were “a special element” that central leaders “had to seize upon to take hold of the 
Komsomol network.”1 Seizing, let alone keeping a hold of, the League’s “special 
element,” however, would prove to be an elusive endeavor.
The history of the cadres that mediated the Komsomol’s Central Committee 
(TsK) and its rank and file has yet to be written. Scholars have discussed the growth 
of the Komsomol in the 1920s, particularly in the countryside, and have noted its 
expanding bureaucracy and systematization as its institutional structures multiplied 
and became wedded to the Bolshevik Party.2 But who were the cadres that staffed 
these structures? What were their living and working conditions? How did these 
conditions shape a cadre’s relationship with and ability to lead their rank and file? 
This article seeks to shed light on these questions.
Examining the Komsomol apparatus by focusing on the individuals that 
inhabited it yields a simple but important contention: Komsomol cadres’ ability 
to establish authority through consent was often undermined by their everyday 
conditions. Without a sturdy material base upon which to generate consent, local 
cadres often relied on domination to exert their authority over their rank-and-
file members and, to some extent, the local population. This reliance ultimately 
perpetuated itself; the more cadres employed coercion, the more the means of consent 
atrophied, which led time and again to domination. Of course, many local Komsomol 
cadres used a combination of tactics to administer their local organizations. However, 
the use of domination over consent was a prevailing trend throughout the 1920s as 
local cadres tried to exert authority. This tendency repeatedly alarmed the rank and 
file and leadership alike. An exploration of social and material relations serves to 
explain the roots of this administrative behavior.
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What do domination and consent mean in this context? I use domination as 
the deployment by an individual or a group of cadres of their authority, power, and 
position to force, exclude, and command the rank and file into action, obedience, or 
submission. Consent, on the other hand, means building leadership through the use of 
persuasion, inclusion, and guidance. In short, the differences between the two can be 
gleaned from this statement, which purported to describe local party officials in Ilino 
district in Smolensk province in the 1920s: “They strive to criticize, to command, 
but they do not . . . explain practically how it is necessary to work . . . [They] lashed 
into everything, saying, in general, that the sections are not working, that the work 
is not set up as it should be, etc., dictating vague trite phrases, but not getting down 
to concrete cases.”3 Similar observations were made of Komsomol cadres.
A reliance on domination affected the functioning of the Komsomol at the local 
level as well as its position as one of the “transmission belts” of Soviet rule. One 
major outcome was to further confirm the fragmented and fragile nature of Soviet 
local governance. Indeed, Vladimir Brovkin argued that the Komsomol represented 
a “transmission belt that snapped,” meaning that the Komsomol failed to function 
as a link between the Party and society. Given the state of the League’s local cadres, 
perhaps the real issue is that there was never a belt to snap.4 
Several scholars have noted the limits of Bolshevik penetration into the structures 
of local governance in the 1920s.5 Even where the Party did make inroads, its ability 
to control local cells was often restricted by local clientelism, patrimonialism, poor 
communication networks, social and economic conditions, as well as the population, 
customs, institutions, and practices of each locale. 6 Scholarship in this vein points 
rather clearly to the Bolshevik state as devoid of substantive hegemony. Indeed, as 
Tracy McDonald observed, the Bolsheviks’ “obsession with loyalty” on the ground 
“captures poignantly [their] sense of its own fragility as a state and a government.”7 
Such loyalty at the base level is easily seen when examining the cadres of 
the Young Communist League. The Komsomol was integral to the expansion of 
Bolshevik influence in the 1920s; in fact, its membership in the provinces dwarfed 
that of the Party. The Bolshevik Party’s membership reflected an overwhelmingly 
urban demographic. In 1927, only 307,000 of the 1.3 million Party members resided 
in the countryside.8 In contrast, of the Komosol’s 1.7 million members in 1925, over 
1 million lived in rural areas.9 In this sense, the Komsomol was the representative of 
the Soviet system in the countryside. Thus, understanding the nature of Soviet rule 
in the 1920s must also take into account the conditions in which the Komsomol’s 
cadres worked and the methods they used to establish authority.
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What is a “Cadre”?
As V. Kuzmin reminded readers in the ABCs of a Komsomolets, “The Komsomol 
demands from every member activism (aktivnost’) in struggle, labor and study, 
it stands as the foremost condition of his membership.”10 In practice, however, 
“activism” ranged from doing as little as attending meetings to taking an official 
position in the local cell. According to one primer, every member who “engage[d] 
in active participation in cell work” was considered an activist and not simply those 
“who are elected or hold a position or give speeches at meetings.”11 This broad notion 
of activist was in line with the League’s populist impulses; rank-and-file participation 
in League or Soviet life facilitated members’ political and ideological development 
and prepared members for promotion. To differentiate from this broad definition 
of “activist,” I use the term “cadre” to refer specifically to those who staffed the 
Komsomol’s structures and offices.12
Grassroots participation was essential for inter-League democracy. Each active 
rank-and-file member, it was believed, helped to hold the apparatus accountable 
to the masses. Yet getting youth involved in local cells on a day-to-day basis was 
difficult. Activism pulled young people away from their friends, families, studies, 
and leisure. Most members, therefore, maintained a minimum commitment—going 
to a meeting here or to a demonstration there—to keep their standing as members. 
In contrast, cadres constituted that small coterie of members who held official 
positions and shouldered the vast majority of Komsomol work. Their “elected” posts 
included secretary positions for cell, district, provincial and Central Committee 
bureaus as well as administrative roles such as political instructors, agitators, and 
organizers. 13 Some of them were paid; being a cadre was their profession. Many 
others, especially at the cell and district levels, volunteered and balanced Komsomol 
work with making a living elsewhere. But the most important factor that distinguished 
a cadre from a rank-and-file activist was responsibility: cadres were held accountable 
for their actions or lack thereof, while rank-and-file members were not. 
For a young communist interested in becoming a cadre, there was no formal 
evaluation procedure, screening, or interview process.14 Cadre work resulted from 
election, volunteerism, recommendation, or promotion at the behest of the local or 
central superiors. Sometimes becoming a cadre was arbitrary, as one commentator 
explained: “They call to the cell a komsomol-newcomer, who is still unaccustomed 
to his komsomol position and ask him: “What kind of work do you want? What 
interests you the most?” The fellow is at a loss and answers, ‘I’ll do whatever you 
give me.’ Well, they do without finding out what this guy is most skilled in.”15 A 
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budding cadre did not have to apply or demonstrate any organizing skills, let alone 
any adherence or knowledge of Marxist ideology. Most cadres had only a basic 
grasp of reading and writing. Often a youth was given the position of cell secretary 
because he was the only one who could read. A member, therefore, could become 
a cadre simply by having a modicum of skill, showing a desire, and displaying a 
measure of responsibility for carrying out the League’s work. The open acceptance 
of anyone willing to serve resulted as much from a scarcity of willingness and talent 
than it did from the Komsomol’s populism. Because of the shortage of talented and 
dedicated cadres, a resourceful activist could rise up the Komsomol command chain 
quite rapidly. 
The end of the civil war dramatically altered the type of cadres that the 
Komsomol required. According to one critic, the cadre of the civil war was “first 
and foremost an administrator.” He worked in an atmosphere without “a plan or 
order” and had to take on “various functions and tasks.” The exigencies of the war 
required him to estrange himself “physically and psychologically” from the masses. 
Cadres thus became masters of “the method of mobilization and organization”; 
they “learned how to boss (rasporiazhat’sia) the masses of League members (even 
then not always successfully), but did not lead them.”16 This type of cadre became 
obsolete when the war ended. In this new era, M. Teterin wrote, “organizational 
ability and enthusiasm alone are not enough.”17 Instead, the Komsomol required 
local cadres who could lead rather than boss, foster consent rather than rely on 
coercion, and serve as political and cultural role models. “Less coercion and more 
persuasion,” wrote Aleksandr Mil’chakov, the Komsomol’s Second Secretary, in 
1926. “A culturally and politically adept leader uses first and foremost persuasion 
... such activists unite, rally and more so, genuinely lead the masses.” Those cadres 
who lacked the “power of persuasion” had to rely on “shouting, pressure, and raw 
and naked force.”18 The Komsomol leadership expected each cadre to keep an open 
rapport with the general membership; in the case of disagreements or apathy, the 
cadre would need to calmly and comprehensively explain the correctness of the Party 
line. The leadership desired these cadres to be serious, organized, conscientious, 
accurate, orderly, abstinent, the “masters of politics and the Party’s policy,” and 
“politically developed enough” to answer any komsomol’s questions.19 According 
to Nikolai Bukharin, this required: “a psychological type who possesses the good 
features of the old Russian intelligentsia in terms of Marxist preparation and broad 
aptitude with American pragmatism. We need Marxism plus Americanism.”20 Such 
skills were in short supply.
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The Komsomol Apparatus in Disarray
The civil war had detrimental effects on the Komsomol’s burgeoning apparatus 
between 1918 and 1922. Committees and cells established after the Komsomol’s 
founding in October 1918 quickly atrophied or collapsed as members were mobilized 
to the front. The demands of the war were so acute that in the Komsomol stronghold 
of Petrograd, its cadres were depleted to the point where “all League activity stopped” 
or committees were handed over to members with “relatively limited organizational 
experience.” Despite efforts to call cadres back from military service to run local 
committees, and even after reaching an agreement with the Party to liquidate 
Komsomol military detachments, the League was in desperate need of revival at 
the end of the war.21
The Komsomol leadership had no accurate account of the quantity and quality 
of its ranks; the war had weakened the few solid ties the Komsomol TsK had with its 
network outside of Russia’s main urban centers. As delegates to the Third Komsomol 
Congress in 1920 noted, TsK directives rarely reached distant organizations. Those 
that did often arrived late, were ignored, or were deemed irrelevant in light of local 
conditions. Part of the problem was that the TsK had only intermittent contact with 
its local organs. Central cadre rolls were poorly maintained and, in many cases, the 
leadership of the local groups was a mystery. 
This confusion was intensified due to rapidly swelling membership; between 
October 1918 and 1920, the Komsomol grew from roughly 22,000 members to 
400,000.22 These numbers were a rough approximation, since bureaucratic confusion 
resulted from war casualties, poor records, the lack of a uniform Komsomol card 
(local organizations often issued their own), tenuous organizational structure, and 
weak communications between center and periphery.23 As a writer known as M. P. 
stated, “Not only could the TsK not definitively indicate the number of members ... 
the regional committees don’t know the official number of its ‘paper’ members or 
the actual number of organizations. It’s impossible to get the local leadership and its 
work on the right track without this knowledge”24 This uncertainty also extended to 
information on the Komsomol’s local cadres. As the Komsomol sought to make the 
transition to peacetime, knowledge about its composition would be vital to effectively 
manage the vast and rapidly growing organization. As Petrograd district secretary 
Petr Smorodin stated at the Third Komsomol Congress in 1920, “An army general 
who doesn’t know his soldiers will be defeated. If we don’t know our workers, we 
won’t know how to use them.”25 
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To get a sense of its actual composition, the Komsomol’s leadership ordered 
a re-registration of its membership throughout the winter and spring of 1920–1921 
in order to accomplish three tasks.26 First, it sought to provide an account of the 
Komsomol’s membership and put local record-keeping in order. Second, it sought to 
purge the Komsomol of undesirables. Finally, the re-registration was a way for the 
center to reestablish contact with local organizations and in particular their cadres 
by mandating new elections of the local executive committees and cell bureaus. 
Thus, in addition to purging the organization and getting a better sense of actual 
membership, the re-registration was vital to the center’s efforts to consolidate its 
control over the periphery. 
The campaign was implemented haphazardly and, in some cases, not at all. 
It mostly proved how chaotic the Komsomol’s rolls really were. By the end of 
the campaign, overall membership plummeted by almost 50 percent to 250,000.27 
Entire cells crumbled because they lacked the members to sustain them.28 Though 
the Komsomol TsK ordered its local units to file monthly reports in 1920, a survey 
in 1922 showed that these often arrived in Moscow two months late, and that two-
thirds of the 107 provincial committees sent nothing. The problems included both 
poor lines of communication and the anti-bureaucratic mentality of cadres. As a 
certain F. Leonov explained, many cadres saw filing reports as “bureaucratic red 
tape” and believed that others should take on the tasks of “statistical-reporters.”29
In the end, the re-registration created as many problems as it aimed to solve. 
Despite the steep downward revision of membership, the figures resulting from the 
re-registration apparently were only somewhat more accurate than before. Also, poor 
reporting of periodic census tallies persisted. As late as June 1923, the membership 
figures General Secretary Smorodin presented at the Third Komsomol Conference 
were only partial. Of the Komsomol’s 72 provincial committees, Smorodin presented 
records from only 23, while 49 provincial committees either failed to count or send 
their tallies.30 Moreover, serious questions persisted about the quality of the League’s 
cadre core. For many, the Komsomol seemed to be in an institutional crisis.
The Pains of Allocating and Distributing Cadres
With this in mind, the TsK conducted a review (peresmotr) of its cadres in 
1922 to get a better sense of its ranks. The review’s main goal was to “decisively 
regroup the cadre of active workers and remove from the ranks those unnecessary 
and inhibiting elements” by evaluating the competency of cadres. One obvious 
goal was to account for who was available for cadre work. 31 Cadres were to present 
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themselves to a higher committee and to submit a short autobiography describing 
their Komsomol work experience, their attitude toward the work, and the types of 
duties they would want to fulfill in the future. Higher committees composed of dual 
Party-Komsomol members (who joined no later than 1919) conducted the reviews of 
their subordinates. Thus, a provincial cadre appeared before the Central Committee, 
a district cadre in front of a provincial cadre, etc. 
These reviews concerned themselves with the leadership qualities of cadres, 
especially their competency and authority among rank-and-file members. Thus, 
the cadre review in the town of Sapozhka, Ryazan province, described the activist 
Shevrigin as having “such authority among the League masses that there was no 
smudge against him” and noted that he “used his authority completely in keeping 
with his title of an activist.” In contrast, the activists Sablina and Vazhenov were 
relieved of their positions because they were “unprepared” or “did not seriously 
carry out their duties.”32 
The cadre review was only the first stage in TsK’s efforts to further consolidate 
its authority and establish a consistent organizational structure. In the fall of 1923, the 
Komsomol Central Committee conducted another census of its cadres and established 
a nomenklatura ranking system. The resulting account of Komsomol cadres included 
an archive of the central and local secretaries and staff members along with each one’s 
skills and backgrounds. This information was meant to create more precise allocation 
and distribution of personnel across the League’s expanding organizational structure. 
The Komsomol’s Organization-Assignment Department (Orgraspred) provided these 
lists to the Party “for the purpose of studying [its] reserve.”33 This information gave 
the Komsomol leadership a better sense of its workforce and allowed for promotion 
of rank-and-file members into leadership positions or of cadres into Party work. Yet 
it reaffirmed that many of the local Komsomol structures were wholly dependent on 
a small staff of workers and that many committees were understaffed.34 
The registration, cadre review, cadre censuses, and nomenklatura system were 
intended to better facilitate the increasingly normative practice of appointing cadres 
to local leadership positions. The Komsomol faced a conundrum similar to the one 
the Party had confronted at the end of the civil war. In order to build an effective 
organizational network, the Komsomol leadership had to, in the words of Graeme 
Gill, strengthen the “integrity and coherence of individual [League] bodies” and 
regularize the “linkages between different levels.” Building organizational integrity 
and linkages in the conditions of postwar Russia required appointments of cadres 
from above. As within the Party, Komsomol appointments “liberated” secretaries 
from the democratic whims of the rank and file; instead cadres became dependent 
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upon and indebted to their superiors for not only their present positions but also 
potential future promotions.35 Appointments from above had important ramifications 
on the Komsomol’s ability to exercise consent at the local level. By crippling cadres’ 
ability to develop authority among the rank and file, the appointment system stymied 
the participation of the general membership and created local leaders who had few 
ties to, let alone knowledge of, local populations and conditions.
Throughout the 1920s, the Komsomol lacked talented personnel to staff its local 
committee branches. To more efficiently allocate its scarce human resources, the TsK 
relied on appointing cadres. “You see, comrades,” Lazar Shatskin told delegates at 
the Third Komsomol Congress in 1920, “we have an extremely small staff of active 
workers.” He went on to note that among that small number there were “extremely 
few good [ones].” The TsK’s ability to tightly control its pool of personnel became 
one of the few means to carry out its directives, consolidate authority, and maintain 
institutional stability.36 Still the Komsomol’s bureaucratic chains were slow and often 
unresponsive. “District committees wait for the provincial committees, the provincial 
committee very often waits for the TsK,” General Secretary Tseitlin complained 
in 1921, presaging a problem that would continue throughout the decade. Direct 
appointment of a known and trusted cadre was a way to enforce accountability and 
to circumvent the normal chain of command. The practice of appointments, although 
mandated, was in some instances welcomed by local committees; they were eager 
for qualified personnel and repeatedly requested staffing from the Komsomol’s 
central office. 
The Lenin Levy, which opened the Komsomol and the Party to a mass influx 
of new members, only increased the League’s demand for cadres, particularly in 
the countryside.37 Over a three-month period—February–April 1924—167,000 new 
recruits flooded the League; A. M. Selivanov estimated that the Komsomol increased 
by 3,000 members a day. This pace was faster than the League’s apparatus could 
absorb, yet it did not stop at the end of the Levy. The Komsomol periodically staged 
recruitment drives in factories and villages, especially on the annual anniversaries 
of the October Revolution.38 In an eighteen-month period, (July–January 1926), the 
Komsomol’s national membership rose from 822,000 to 1,769,519, and the number 
of cells increased from 28,516 to 52,783. The number of peasants in the membership 
rolls tripled to 753,817 and the number of rural cells doubled to 38,796. In Smolensk 
alone, the number of rural cells went from 296 to 631.39 Such growth brought the 
League’s rural network, in the words of Isabel Tirado, to “the brink of becoming an 
autonomous political organization.”40 Hundreds of newly minted peasant komsomols 
petitioned to have cells recognized without leadership “from above.”41 
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To rapidly fill vacant positions, the Komsomol TsK was forced to appoint 
less experienced members to positions of authority. The majority of new cadres 
in factory and village cells had joined the Komsomol only two years before 
getting their positions; a survey of district committees in Ryazan province in 1927 
showed that one-third of cadres had only one year of cadre experience.42 Moreover, 
urbanites transferred to the countryside were often ignorant of rural conditions. As 
a result, some local organizations even refused to take new transfers from cities: 
a certain V. Rulev, for example, was sent back to Moscow because he had only 
four months of activist experience. Many village cells sent cadres back to their 
original organizations because they were “poorly familiar with League work in the 
village.”43 Local Komsomol leaders complained that they were sent cadres without 
the qualifications, and often, as a certain Breitman reported, “not a single one [of 
the cadres] corresponded to the transfer agreement.”44 
While local organizations refused to take on incompetent cadres, technically, 
cadres had some say in their own transfers. A cadre could request a transfer as long 
as the sending and receiving organizations agreed to the move. If either organization 
refused the request, it had to justify that refusal with a written rationale. Most 
transfers, however, occurred by order of a cadre’s superiors. And while cadres 
could theoretically decline an ordered transfer, such a refusal was taboo. Every 
komsomol, after all, was duty-bound to execute orders from above. Committees 
often drew on this commitment by appealing to an intransigent cadre’s “komsomol 
duty and conscience.” When such entreaties failed, superiors in the organization 
simply threatened cadres with expulsion.45 
The Komsomol’s reliance on transfers reinforced cadres’ estrangement from 
the local membership and the broader communities that they served. Cadres spent 
little time, often less than one year, serving in a particular area, and rarely worked in 
their home districts. For example, from May to December 1925, the Kursk provincial 
committee transferred forty-eight cadres to its various districts and only seven of 
those were natives to the province.46 
These Central Committee–initiated transfers to rural areas, which often occurred 
as part of larger campaigns to fill vacancies in the countryside, resulted in cadres 
who had no personal or cultural ties to the areas in which they worked. Cadres’ 
efforts to make connections with locals were further hindered by geography of their 
assignments; some cadres had as many as twenty cells spread out over 300 miles and 
no means to travel between them.47 Other cadres—such as Dmitrii Yashin, who was 
sent to work in the Kerch district committee in the Crimea— simply found themselves 
on committees that treated them as invading outsiders. When Yashin arrived, his 
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fellow bureau members refused to put him on the rolls and denied him work. He 
eventually discovered that the root of such hostility was a widespread perception that 
cadres “divided [themselves] between ‘us’ and ‘them’” and that newcomers were 
spies for the center. Yashin, who had expected to be included into the community of 
fellow young communists, decided to leave the Komsomol completely since “when 
a komsomol lands in Kerch, he’s not considered a komsomol.”48 
Unsurprisingly, newly transferred komsomols became personally disillusioned, 
isolated, or unable to adjust to their new surroundings. This was especially the case 
for cadres sent to the countryside from cities and towns. These activists were often 
unprepared for village life or politics; some who were “afraid of the village” were 
reported to “have shown weakness and [run] away.” Others simply chose not to 
comply with their transfer orders. One report explained that activists “panicked” 
at the prospect of going to the village, leading some to “refuse to work” and to 
“sometimes consciously not fulfill the decisions of League committees.”49 
Rough and intolerable local conditions prompted many cadres to immediately 
look for a way out of their posts, whatever the cost. They used tactics like foot-
dragging, feigning incompetency, or purposely fueling discord within their 
organizations. To save face (and to rid themselves of a useless worker), local 
leaders usually requested the re-transfer of reticent cadres. One report sent from 
Kazakhstan noted that four of their new arrivals—Mosin, Goldenberg, Bernat, and 
Koslov—used a combination of intentional slacking, incompetence, and offensive 
actions in order to be sent back to Russia. Eventually “feelings of mistrust” began 
growing in the organization because of these cadres’ disparaging treatment toward 
other komsomols. Finally, the provincial committee requested that the TsK transfer 
them out reporting: “The comrades don’t want to work and constantly think about 
returning to Russia and look at their stay in Syr-Dar’e as a temporary exile. . . . The 
Syr-Darinskii provincial committee considers the further stay of these comrades 
in Komsomol work in our province impossible and ask you to allow the transfer 
of [them] into your command and if this is impossible, we ask you to permit their 
transfer into Soviet work.”50 
Another tactic that cadres used to get out of village assignments was to 
emphasize their faithful Komsomol service. Luba Zabolotskaya, for example, 
appealed to Komsomol General Secretary Nikolai Chaplin, explaining that she had 
arrived in the countryside in 1924 “full of enthusiasm, heroism, and devoted to all 
work forgetting myself entirely.” Upon her arrival, she started a local Komsomol 
cell and even began a Pioneer group. “Everyone’s strength was focused on work 
and the results were visible as youth began to hold their heads high,” she declared. 
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After eighteen months of hard work, Zabolotskaya realized that although her constant 
dedication bore fruit, it left her no time “to expand her horizons.” She wanted to move 
to the city in order to “learn or serve,” emotionally proclaiming, “It torments me 
that this [place] is not Leninist.” Worried that Chaplin would interpret her personal 
desire to be unbecoming of a komsomol, Zabolotskaya declared: “It is difficult to 
find the right moral path.” But, she asserted, “I sincerely worked for two years to the 
end of the school year and now I will apply all my effort to get back to the city.”51 
Whether she made it or not is unknown.
Frequent transfers could be a burden on an activist and his or her family. One 
komsomol, for example, pleaded to the Ryazan gubkom (provincial committee of the 
Party) to stop bouncing him from one organization to another. He had been transferred 
to six different districts, he complained, and could not continue to move around 
because of the strains it put on his family.52 Perhaps most interestingly, komsomols 
transferred at their own risk. Neither the sending nor receiving organization could 
“guarantee them work or material support.”53 Cadres often arrived to horrible living 
conditions and to salaries that were either delayed for two to three months or that 
never arrived (negligence and slow paperwork were usually to blame). Purchasing 
the necessities of daily life could prove impossible. Cadres fell delinquent on their 
rents and even found themselves taken to court by their landlords. Others could not 
find a place to live at all.54 
Becoming a Cadre
Since the end of the civil war, the Komsomol had been elevated to the “helper” 
and “reserve” of the Bolshevik Party. The Komsomol’s role as “reserve” was codified 
in the new regulations adopted in 1926. Only then it was clearly stated that the 
Komsomol and the Party were linked in a chain of promotion in which “the best 
members of the Komsomol enter into the [Party’s] ranks and must be prepared to 
be worth of fulfilling its great and laborious duties.”55 Cadres were considered the 
“best members” and were guaranteed Party membership. The Party held periodic 
mass recruitments in efforts to, on one hand, promote cadres and, on the other, to 
strengthen Party leadership over the League.56 In reality, however, internal League 
reports lamented the low percentage of cadres who were dual party members and 
their marginalization from party life, particularly in the provinces.57
A Case Study: Semen Kozyrev
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Cadre work did benefit some young people. The autobiography of Semen 
Kozyrev, for example, portrays the smooth and rapid rise of a Komsomol cadre in 
the early 1920s. After a mere year and a half in the Komsomol, the nineteen-year 
old Kozyrev climbed from his position as a worker in a dye factory to the chairman 
of the Komsomol’s economic commission. His life story between 1921 and 1925 
demonstrates one story of how the Komsomol attracted young people of the time 
by offering a potentially viable avenue by which to improve facets of their lives.
Semen Kozyrev was born in 1903 to a working-class family in Moscow 
province. His parents both worked in the Gerasimov dye factory. Kozyrev worked 
alongside his mother at a textile-twisting machine until he was eight years old (he 
did not state when he began working). He then studied in a village school for three 
years but fell one year short of finishing. The outbreak of WWI brought hard times 
on his family and, just a few months shy of twelve years, Semen was forced to quit 
school and return to work in the factory. 
The war brought dramatic changes to the Kozyrev family. Semen noted that 
between 1914 and 1918, they moved to the countryside where they worked “a small 
patch of land.” Although factory wages had supported the family prior to the war, 
during the war they “had nothing, not even a hut in the village of Streltsakh.” To 
make ends meet, his father began working as a forest guard. The younger Kozyrev 
continued working at the Gerasimov factory, first at a stamping machine and then as 
a packer. After the Revolution broke out in 1917, he fell in with a group of “social 
democratic youth.” He was drawn to them because he liked to read the newspapers 
at their meetings. Soon after, he began hanging out with a worker named Filimonov, 
who introduced him to the Bolsheviks. At this point Kozyrev became politically 
active. Along with seven other youths, he formed a “batch of youth” between the 
ages of fifteen and nineteen who “collectively” read the newspaper Social Democrat 
and “supported Bolshevik orators at workers’ meetings.” He also joined the textile 
union, where he was elected to represent worker youth on the factory subcommittee 
on wages.
In 1921, Kozyrev joined the Komsomol and volunteered for the Red Army, 
where he served in a Special Purposes Unit for five months. He began active 
Komsomol work in 1922. His Komsomol career quickly took off from there. Already 
seasoned by revolution and soldiering, which made him a popular choice among his 
fellow comrades, Kozyrev was selected to be a district committee member and, by 
the end of 1922, to be its secretary. In addition to his Komsomol work, he became 
a Party candidate member in June 1922 and a full member eight months later. His 
class lineage, position as cell secretary, and military background certainly helped 
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his rapid promotion into the Party and then from candidacy to full membership. In 
1923, he was elected to the Komsomol Riazan provincial presidium as the chairman 
of its economic commission, a position he was still holding in 1925, when he wrote 
his autobiography.58
What can be inferred from Kozyrev’s biography about Komsomol cadres? 
First, Kozyrev’s social and economic background is representative: most Komsomol 
cadres came from worker or peasant backgrounds with little education. For example, 
a 1927 survey of Ryazan cadres reported that 88 percent of secretaries of village 
cells came from peasant backgrounds, while 75 percent of secretaries of factory 
cells came from worker backgrounds. Similarly, the majority of Ryazan district 
secretaries were from worker and peasant backgrounds: 45 percent and 42 percent, 
respectively.59 A national survey found similarly high rates of workers and peasants 
leading cells and district committees.60 
The Komsomol offered new prospects to lower-class youth, and Kozyrev was 
one of the curious young men for whom activism provided opportunities for self-
improvement. Time and again, he referred to the Komsomol as a space in which 
young people collectively read news about the world. Komsomol membership 
opened up new horizons to youths like Kozyrev who, if they were politically deft, 
could easily carve out careers at a time when talent was short. 
“It Is Impossible To Work In Such Conditions”
Despite the potential benefits of service, the life of a Komsomol cadre was far 
from glamorous. Cadres were perpetually overburdened with work, which often 
contributed to their failure to develop good relations with the general membership. 
Given the daily pressures, cadres found it easier and more expedient to rule by 
domination rather than consent. 
Despite the ease with which a rank-and file-member could become a cadre, 
there were never enough members willing to take on the League’s daily work. The 
center expected its cadres to carry out its directives while catering to the interests 
of the membership. In addition to filing reports, answering queries, and fulfilling 
directives, cadres were supposed to organize social and cultural events. The center 
demanded that cadres not only serve on the soviets but also organize and participate 
in reelection campaigns. Cadres ran the local reading rooms and facilitated reading 
circles, discussion groups, clubs, and other cultural-ideological work. They were 
also responsible for leading the local Pioneer troops. Cadres were most successful in 
providing cultural activities for local youth; reading rooms were particularly popular, 
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and tended to lose their political message amid the entertaining environments. In 
response, the Party appointed trained educators to run the reading rooms, which 
diluted the influence of the Komsomol.61 
Cadres who found themselves solely responsible for the existence of their 
cells often became resentful, which helped them justify their continued reliance on 
domination. As Komsomolskaya pravda noted, “Activists frequently take all the 
work onto themselves, run from meeting to meeting, delve into circulars, plans, 
give speeches etc. The Komsomol masses do nothing.”62 Many cadres had no time 
for personal enrichment and study, let alone rest and leisure. As a result, cadres 
were overtaxed, had low morale, suffered from work-induced mental and physical 
ailments, and often lived a poor quality of life despite promises of better living.
No Komsomol secretary, regardless of administrative level, was a member of 
just one bureau or committee. One secretary named Dmitri Smirnov, for example, 
complained that one of his comrades held a litany of positions: he was the secretary 
of his cell, a district committee member, responsible for leading three village cells, 
chairman of labor security committee, a member of the district peasant committee, a 
member of the village peasant committee, head of the reading room, and a member 
of the club’s board.63 One commentator wrote, “5-10 cadres in good faith fulfill a 
workload that is roughly speaking for 40 members.”64 
Owing to all of these positions, a majority of a cadre’s time was spent in 
meetings. As V. A. Kasimenko, the deputy of the League’s propaganda department, 
noted, “In the Krasnaya Presnia district in Moscow every cell worker has 14 
meetings a week . . . and even the cell secretary has 14 meetings in a week, maybe 
the situation is better in the village but there it is even worse.”65 Multiple duties on 
top of multiple meetings created a scheduling nightmare for cadres; meetings often 
overlapped, forcing a cadre to choose which to attend and which to miss. As one 
cadre complained, “At one and the same time I was nominated to the Party meeting 
(for my report), the meeting of the Trade Union (for my report), and the bureau of the 
[rural district committee] (for my report). I decided to go to the Komsomol meeting 
but I sent my certificate materials to the rest. On my certificate they replied: ‘1) You 
are a Party member, so do not forget your Party discipline; 2) You are a member 
of the trade union, and you must not forget trade union discipline.’ How does one 
find a way around this?”66 Each meeting could last for hours. A typical factory cell 
meeting was described this way: 
The meeting was called at 7:30. It’s already 8. Only 300 komsomols out of 
634 showed up. The meeting opened at 8:30. The orator hurled thunder and 
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lightning on the heads of Poincare and Chamberlain. It was smoky and stuffy 
in the hall. Some talk in one corner, nibble on sunflower seeds in another, and 
in a third ardently practice boxing. The orator says “In short . . .” The rows 
[begin to] empty. The first speaker gives way to a second, the second to a 
third. After every report the chairman beseeches the meeting, “Who wants to 
speak in discussion? Petrov, would you like to?” There is a dead silence among 
the attendees; an unknown voice timidly sounds, “Everything is clear.” “Did 
the report have some kind of proposal?” Again, dead silence. The clock has 
already struck midnight.67
Weighty silences often met the business at hand in Komsomol meetings. Often, 
attendees chatted with friends, boxed in a corner, played games like blind man’s 
bluff or cards, or slouched in a corner asleep rather than engaging with the meeting. 
Some men used the opportunity of close quarters to flirt with women. Adding to the 
obstacles presented by an indifferent rank and file, cadres showed up to meetings 
unprepared, ragged from overwork or unable to juggle their litany of duties. The 
secretary of a meeting in the Matusov factory suggested that they skip the agenda 
item of inducting new members because he had “forgot the applicants’ applications 
at home.”68 Unresponsive, disinterested crowds, unprepared secretaries, and boring 
speech after boring speech were made worse by drawn-out sessions. Secretaries 
and attendees alike were happy just to get through the meetings, sometimes even 
working to shut down discussions. When members of one cell wanted to discuss 
their secretary’s report, he turned to them and said, “I’m tired. I just can’t. I ask that 
discussion not be opened.”69 
In addition to the multiple and never-ending meetings, cadres also complained 
about the deluge of paperwork. Each secretary was expected to keep a daily log of 
his cell’s activities and file monthly reports to the district committee. These reports 
tended to consist of several pages cataloguing the organization’s composition, mood, 
activities, living conditions, and relations with the local population. In addition, 
secretaries had to send information and materials requested by the upper echelons. 
As one cadre from Leningrad complained, “There are commissions, meetings, 
conferences, plenums, circulars, resolutions, protocols, subscriptions, relations, 
committee work, membership cards, questionnaires, the coordination of questions 
and problems, and so on and so on.”70 The Komsomol leadership was aware of the 
overwhelming amount of paperwork required of local cadres. “Ninety-five percent 
of an activist’s time,” Nikolai Chaplin reported, “is spent on a variety of paperwork, 
writing circulars, and on defining the so-called ‘line.’” This paper pushing, Chaplin 
explained, translated into “the well-known danger of ossification of our activists, his 
bureaucratism, and his isolation from the masses.”71 Often, paperwork was ignored 
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amid a perpetual stack of incoming and outgoing documents or, as one provincial 
secretary named Kliuchinskii explained, left undone for lack of supplies. “We also 
don’t send [reports], but not because we are against them in principle, but because 
there is no money to buy paper and we can’t print up the forms.”72
The shortages of materials, stacks of backlogged requests from the center, 
circular memos, and other paper must have driven a cell secretary mad. Despite 
these labors, rank-and-file members were often uninterested in and unappreciative 
of the cadres’ efforts. Moreover, office conditions were not conducive to managing 
the deluge of paperwork. The dearth of office space was reflected in the TsK call for 
“the creation a special office for activists in several organizations” in order to give 
cadres a permanent place to work and a mailing address to which the TsK could 
send its directives. Most village activists worked and conducted meetings at the local 
Party office (if there was one), the local club (if there was one), or at a space rented 
from a local resident. Sometimes a cell secretary’s office was his own apartment. 
Regional Komsomol offices were usually located in a small room containing a desk 
stacked with files and papers, surrounded by a few wooden chairs. If the bureau was 
really lucky, it had a cabinet in which to store its documents and supplies.73 Memos 
attempting to discipline office work suggest that working conditions were poor and 
discipline was lax, even at the Central Committee offices. One memo chastised TsK 
employees for throwing “garbage, paper, broken glass etc.” out their office windows. 
Another ordered workers to make sure everything was in order before they left for 
the evening. This included making sure all desks were cleared of “files and papers,” 
as well as “doors locked, windows closed, and lights turned off.”74
Cadres found long hours even more difficult to bear because they received little 
monetary compensation. Only cadres at the level of or above district committee were 
paid a salary, and that was, on average, quite low. A rural district cadre received an 
average of twenty-five rubles a month, while a city cadre collected thirty rubles. By 
comparison, the average monthly wage for a worker in 1925 was sixty-four rubles.75 
A cadre’s monthly salary was hardly enough to live on; lucky cadres supplemented 
their Komsomol income with coveted positions such as forest wardens, mailmen, 
or policemen.76 Other cadres sent appeals to their superiors for more money or sent 
threats to quit Komsomol work altogether. Abandoning activism because of low pay 
was especially acute in the countryside during the summer months. With school out 
and no harvest to attend to, young cadres ran to the nearest town to pick up extra 
income working in factories; this brought local Komsomol activity to a halt.77 To 
make matters worse, cadres’ pay was often delayed, disorganized (over who should 
be paid and how much), or simply nonexistent. Complaints about low pay reflected 
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cadres’ need and desperation. Nikolai Lutkov, a district secretary, was taken to court 
for not paying his rent, and, as a result, his organization threatened to expel him 
for violating “League discipline.” He wrote to Secretary Chaplin that he was paid 
only fourteen rubles a month but paid twenty rubles a month in rent. “This is utter 
mockery,” he wrote. “Do you think 14 rubles is enough for me to exist on, if I don’t 
own my own farm and I’m in a strange village and must rent an apartment for 20 
rubles?” Clearly committed to his Komsomol work but unable to support himself, 
Lutkov lamented, “I don’t know what to do in this situation.” He continued, “I lie in 
a bed without enough clothes or shoes, and if I leave, the organization will inevitably 
collapse because almost all of the active workers have left. After all we have 73 
people in the organization and several district committees have 30–40 people who 
are on the TsK payroll. They chastise me for [writing] this letter, saying that I engage 
in squabbles, but I don’t know how to work it out. . . . If nothing is done, then I’ll 
probably quit.”78 Similarly, a district secretary from Ryazan described how his pay 
hardly covered his living expenses. He paid twenty-four rubles for a room with a 
desk and five rubles in dues to the Komsomol and other organizations. After these 
expenses, he was left with only two rubles to live on.79 
Others did not bother to explain their situation and simply demanded that the 
Komsomol leadership pay for their service. A certain Levek wrote to the TsK to 
explain that his activism left his family in poverty. He often traveled back and forth 
to help his household, but the situation had become even worse after his brother was 
drafted into the army. “I don’t work now, but study,” Levek explained. “My family 
situation is catastrophic. . . . Therefore I appeal the TsK for assistance and ask it to 
give me 10,000 rubles for my family’s relief.”80
Some cadres took a more direct route to make up for their poor income: 
embezzling Komsomol funds. One telling example involved a man named 
Abaildinov, a provincial secretary who embezzled 104 rubles from membership dues 
that he collected. After he was caught, Abaildinov denied the crime and argued that 
he was only guilty of miscalculating the dues. According to records, Abaildinov was 
“strongly convinced that he had a right to use dues for his salary” because, “he had 
not received his salary.” In addition, he argued that, after all, “he took very little.” 
Abaildinov was also accused of accepting a blanket instead of dues from a member 
named Toidenazarov. 
Other cadres collected membership dues but never turned the money over to the 
Komsomol. One report from the Narynsk district stated, “the cell’s work is limited 
to the collection of dues. All the dues are collected by a representative who takes 
them in three categories: 3 rubles, 1 ruble 50 kopecks, and 90 kopecks.” The district 
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committee cadres divvied up the cash among themselves, claiming that they had not 
been adequately paid.81 Still other cadres embezzled funds and then skipped town 
before they were caught. One circular from the TsK warned members to be on the 
lookout for Vasilii Zaranin, a former secretary of a village soviet in Novosibirsk who 
ran off with 186 rubles. Before he disappeared, he made sure to steal his photograph, 
personnel file, certificates, references, and recommendations from committees on his 
past work. Presumably, Zaranin figured (most likely correctly) that he could easily 
turn up somewhere in a Komsomol organization and begin anew.82
A Komsomol cadre, therefore, had to be willing to live a very spartan lifestyle 
and be an adroit juggler of time and energy. His responsibilities included: convening 
and facilitating meetings; making sure those meetings were focused and did not 
drone on too long; keeping a record of members, their dues payments, and meeting 
attendance; writing up meeting protocols and other paperwork; filing monthly reports; 
coordinating the local study, drama, and other political education circles; keeping 
track of outgoing and incoming correspondence from above; and other secretarial 
tasks.83 In turn, the cell secretary was expected to be the face of the Komsomol and, 
in many places, of the Soviet state. He often had to be the liaison between the local 
soviet, the Party, and other institutions. He also had to address the complaints and 
needs of local youth. Though all Komsomol members were duty-bound to fulfill 
their cells’ plans, the enactment of that responsibility fell squarely on the secretary’s 
shoulders. 
These activities and responsibilities had detrimental ramifications on the health 
and well being of cadres. Concern about the effects of overwork prompted the 
Komsomol leadership to commission a survey of cadres’ health, living conditions, 
leisure, and morale. One 1925 survey questioned 300 cadres. It is perhaps a testament 
to their overload that only 125 responded to the Central Committee’s inquiries. The 
results, published as The Labor, Leisure, and Sleep of a Komsomol-Activist in 1926, 
reveal telling—though unsurprising—facts about cadres’ lives. The survey found that 
Komsomol cadres worked an average of 12 hours and 17 minutes daily; on Sunday, 
their supposed day off, they logged an average of 8 hours and 19 minutes.84 One 
repeated complaint in the survey was that this schedule left cadres little time to eat. 
One cadre reported that he had not taken a lunch break in over two months because 
he “couldn’t fit it in.” Another explained that the constant filling out of reports 
prevented him from having a decent meal. “I never eat lunch at the appropriate hour 
and very rarely eat hot food, but I snack on something.” 85 “And it’s like this all the 
time,” added one activist. “The TsK [needs to] correctly and appropriately study this 
issue because it is impossible to work in such conditions. Frequent reports (which 
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are unacceptable to refuse) and all kinds of meetings take up a lot of time. To fill 
one’s bag with theory and broaden one’s horizons appears impossible. I think that 
the TsK needs to decisively spell out the workload of an activist.”86 The TsK tried 
throughout the 1920s to alleviate the burden on local activists by passing resolutions 
to limit the number and length of meetings, create subcommittees to improve League 
work, and draw in more rank and file participation.87 Unfortunately, such measures 
did little to alleviate overburdened cadres or to increase general participation.
According to the respondents, almost two-thirds of Komsomol cadres were 
stricken with an ailment. These included anemia, neurasthenia, cardioneurosis, 
bronchitis, respiratory inflammation, tuberculosis, defective heart, malaria, chronic 
rheumatism, and poor eyesight. Granted, Komsomol cadres had endured the same 
hardships between 1914 and 1921 as had the general population and were therefore 
inflicted with many of the common diseases of the day. Yet many of them also suffered 
from ailments directly related to stress and overwork, such as chronic headaches 
and neurasthenia. As one activist, who worked nights because of the “urgency of 
the work,” complained, “I work from 10 p.m. to 7 a.m. Beginning at 4 a.m. my head 
terribly hurts all day.”88 
Cadres’ living conditions contributed to their poor health. Technically, the 
Komsomol was to help cadres find housing, but shortages and bureaucratic backlogs 
kept many waiting. Though activism promised the chance to get away from home, 
many cadres were forced to continue living with their parents, where the long hours 
spent attending to Komsomol work caused family conflicts. Komsomol surveys 
found cadres living on their own suffered from “hunger and cold” in cramped and 
stuffy rooms. Few had their own beds; many slept in shifts, two to a bed, or on the 
floor. Cadres slept five to seven hours on average, and much of that was restless. 
Some activists suffered from insomnia and slept only one to three hours a night.89 
The lucky ones were able to find a place in dormitories, while rural cadres spent 
the summer months in dachas and returned to the city in the winter. Many cadres, 
however, simply felt they were “at a dead end.”90 
The lack of housing for cadres extended to employees in the Central Committee. 
One report from 1926 noted that one-third of Central Committee cadre families were 
left without housing and that their situation had become “extremely critical” after the 
Party Administration Committee reneged on its promise to allocate apartments. One 
appeal came from Beliakov, a worker for TsK Istmol (Commission for the Study of 
the History of the Russian Youth Movement).91 Beliakov wrote to Nikolai Chaplin 
and Istmol Chairman Shatskin requesting to be moved up the queue to receive an 
apartment from the Management Department. He was fourth in line, he reported, 
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and according to the department head he could expect to wait at least five months 
for an apartment. Beliakov rationalized, “I think that comrades in line ahead of me 
have more possibility to wait 2–4 months for an apartment because they all have 
some kind of room.” Unlike these comrades, Beliakov and his wife were living in 
the kitchen of a communal apartment. He claimed that because of these “abnormal 
conditions his wife’s health worsened every day.” To make matters worse, he was 
supporting his brother and sister, each living in an individual room, and thus had 
to pay for three living spaces. Such conditions, he argued, were having detrimental 
effects on his Istmol work. In addition, after the Istmol staff reduction in October 
1926, all of the organizational and technical work of Istmol had fallen on him. “I 
am extremely burdened with work as the only worker in Istmol,” he wrote. The 
labor for the upcoming Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution was so great 
that he worked from home five to seven hours a day, but only after midnight “when 
the children stop crying and the cannonade of pots and pans ceases.” If his request 
for a new apartment could not be met, Beliakov asked to be removed from Central 
Committee work so he could join the army because his present conditions were 
starting to affect his morale and health.92 
Stress levels, low pay, poor health, and inadequate living conditions had 
profound effects on activists’ attitudes toward their work. The burnout was visible in 
a survey of delegates attending the Eighth Komsomol Congress in 1928. The survey 
made clear that activists were “split into two camps”—new and old. The longer 
activists worked in the Komsomol, the more the job weighed on them. Favorable 
attitudes were more prevalent among those active for less than a year. One respondent 
went so far as to say that Komsomol work was “the most lively and interesting work 
that always seethed with healthy creative meaning.” Seasoned cadres, on the other 
hand, were “weighed down and overburdened.” One district secretary wrote, “I’ve 
been working for six years. I feel that I’m starting to not have the energy I used to 
before. I’m sick of this work. I want to leave.”93 Another secretary concurred, “I see 
work in the Komsomol as a job (sluzhba). I’m sick of it because I’m overloaded 
to capacity.” Others became quite cynical, viewing their Komsomol duties as 
“useless.” They found the work took “a lot of strength and energy” but could “not 
see any beneficial results.” Cadres thus sometimes chose to “go work in industry 
and get training.” As one cadre wrote, “It’s better to work in a factory. I will not be 
a secretary.”94 When one secretary from Vladimir province found that he was not 
reelected to his cell’s bureau, he declared, “Thank god, I’m free.”95
Several activists pointed out that the deluge of paperwork made them long 
for the simplicity of factory work. “When I’m in the factory, I feel great,” wrote 
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one union representative. “But when I return to the committee, I’m grief stricken: 
summaries, handouts, and summaries. I’m barely literate and [when] I sometimes 
make mistakes in the wording, the guys laugh . . . I would be happy to go back to 
the factory, but they won’t let me.” A provincial secretary wrote that he was tired of 
the constant squabbling among committee members. “I was always in high spirits, 
but recently the squabbles in apparatus of my region make me very uneasy. They 
unfortunately flare up not on the principle [but] . . . to pad one’s resume—that is 
the cause of our squabbles.” A secretary of a city district simply got fed up with the 
sheer hypocrisy of his superiors. “I view life positively, but sometimes depression 
seizes me especially when I see how often words are divorced from deeds. Take 
this example. Our gubkom secretary always shouts about proletarian morals and 
he himself left his wife and baby for another. They know about this in the Party 
gubkom and they just laugh. What remains is a child left to the mercy of fate.”96 One 
district secretary summed everything up: “We don’t have the special energy which 
moved Tsarist Russia to the October Revolution in our time. We remain far behind 
our old Bolshevik guard.97 
Romanovshchina
By 1926, there was a growing sense, even among the Komsomol’s top 
leadership, that cadres were becoming more and more isolated from the rank and 
file. Interestingly, the divide was neither class nor age-based. Cadres not only had 
similar class backgrounds to their members but also were usually of the same age. 
In 1927, 74 percent of Komsomol members fell between the ages of seventeen and 
twenty-two years old, and the majority of cadres also fell within this range. In Ryazan, 
for example, the majority of factory and village cell secretaries, 69 percent and 52 
percent respectively, were between twenty-one and twenty-four years old.98 The gap 
between cadres and the general membership, therefore, was based in power and 
position rather than in demographic metrics. Thus, while cadres complained about 
their workload and its impact on the quality of their lives, the general perception 
among the rank and file was that the Komsomol’s cadres ruled over them. Instances 
in which cadres used their position and power for their own personal advantage only 
reinforced this image. Ordinary members flooded the TsK with letters of complaint 
citing examples of cadre corruption and malfeasance. The komsomol Ablov wrote 
that his district secretary considered “work generally unimportant” because he 
was more interested in “engaging in hooliganism, drunkenness, and playing the 
accordion.” To make matters worse, Ablov complained, some cell secretaries were 
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following his example: “Meetings occur irregularly, the cell secretaries are under the 
influence of the district secretary, and the district secretary is under the influence of 
samogon [moonshine].”99 For Grigorii Abramovich, a longtime Komsomol member 
and civil war veteran, cadres had become nothing but hopeless careerists and 
bureaucrats who “attach a star on their lapel” and thought they had “a right to hold 
on to their posts.” Abramovich believed that cadres who took on Komsomol work 
to ensure “climbing into the Party” symbolized how they had become a separate 
layer within the League. “The Komsomol is broken into two camps: activists and 
non-activists,” he wrote.100 Indeed, many komsomols viewed cadres simply as “staff 
activists”: bureaucrats and officials (chinovniki) who monopolized and controlled all 
speech and activities, stifled general participation, or used their authority to coerce 
others and their position for profit.101 
Cadres’ reliance on and protection of their authority confirmed Abramovich’s 
charge that the Komsomol was split between “activists and non-activists.” Indeed, 
activists deployed a particular lexicon that inflated their aptitude and importance, 
attempted to make up for their shortcomings, and tried to browbeat rank and filers 
into submission. Cadres incorporated the stilted discourse of internal documents into 
their everyday speech. Some of this confused rhetoric not only befuddled the rank 
and file but also became a topic of much derision in the Komsomol press. Cadres 
used words like “reconcile” (soglasovyvat’), “coordinate” (uvyazyvat’), “make it 
plain” (vyyavit’), and “ascertain” (ustanovit’). Common cadre phrases included 
“concrete measures” (konkretnoe meropriyatie), “set by the line” (napravit’ po linii), 
“concentrate facts” (skontsentrirovat’ dannye), “proceed to the right moment” (pereiti 
k nadlezhashchemu momentu), and “raise a question directly” (stavit vopros rebrom). 
Cadres even used this “muddy flow of bureaucratic tongue twisters” “at home, around 
friends, [and] at the movies.” Terms and phrases alien to common people were used 
“to show off”; cadres “muttering words with no regard to their meaning” were said 
to be displaying their expertise and “imaginary education.” Indeed, according to one 
cynical report, when one cadre gave a speech littered with these words and phrases, 
peasants “seized every word of this ‘enlightener’ and after listening to the report 
became ‘competent’ in international affairs. The peasants decided that the Triple 
Entente declared war on the League of Nations that they don’t pay the salaries of 
the mercenaries of global capital, and they assembled to strike.”102
Cadres also showed a propensity to spout off slogans gleaned from newspapers, 
speeches by Party notables, and texts by Marx and Lenin. This kind of parroting 
demonstrated dialectical dilettantism rather than political erudition: “On the one 
hand the sunset cannot be firmly declared (konstatirovat’),” one budding dialectician 
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explained, “but on the other it’s necessary to recognize the moonrise, and altogether 
perceive a definite lack of coordination [between the two].”103 When pressed into a 
corner, one cadre declared at a general meeting, “Comrades! Turning specifically to 
the current issue, after summarizing and schematizing all my calculations, I think 
we need to approach such issues as economic work with great caution and not open 
it up for debate. For now, I suggest we only confine ourselves to making a plan.” 
M. Teterin, who quoted this passage, explained that this was just one example of 
activists who “go and drum memorized slogans not having a damn clue about them 
(sam ni khren ne ponimaia).”104 
Komsomol critics such as M. Teretin perceived such sloganeering and 
bureaucratese as symptoms of a larger disease afflicting the Kosmomol’s cadres: 
the so-called know-it-alls. “Know-it-all” cadres were characterized by the saying, 
“Well, I’m an activist and I know everything though I’ve studied nothing and I always 
shut the rank and filers up.”105 These cadres saw themselves as the embodiment of 
Komsomol authority rather than inspirational figures to help youth to become active 
participants in building socialism. They exercised power with declarations that they 
viewed “as compulsory and authoritative” rather than gaining influence through 
leadership, discussion, and the inclusion of the rank and file in decisions. Many 
of these “know-it-alls” were guilty of what Lenin called “communist arrogance” 
(komchvanstvo) in that they disregarded the opinions of everyone around them. 
Insecure about their ability to maintain control, these cadres took any challenge 
as an affront to their authority. They tended to shut down discussions and used 
pressure (nazhim) rather than persuasion to argue their positions. When general 
members spoke at meetings, “know-it-alls” shouted down, ignored, laughed, or sat 
in a corner with other cadres and whispered.106 Some cadres considered it beneath 
them to even talk to the rank and file. As one member complained, “Our activists 
think that members of the bureau—the secretary, political educator, representative 
to the district committee—are the cell and no one else.”107 Critics proclaimed that 
these cadres only fostered inactivity and conservatism in the Komsomol apparatus.108
It would be a mistake, however, to reduce the “know-it-alls” to insecure, 
power-hungry individuals. In many ways, they reflected activists’ material and work 
conditions. To a great extent, cadres were caught in a catch-22. After all, how else 
could they exert authority over or promote inclusion among the rank and file—let 
alone know the ins and outs of political theory or the latest political line—when 
they were busy filling out reports and running back and forth between meetings? 
As one cell secretary explained, “I would be happy to promote a guy to any kind of 
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work, but if he’s not developed and incapable of doing this work, then it is in my 
interest to just do it myself.”109
The Komsomol leadership attempted to improve the quality of its activists, 
even requiring them to attend short training courses ranging from a few days to a 
few weeks. These courses included seminars titled Leninism, Contemporary Politics, 
Capitalism and Class Struggle, and the Economy of the USSR, as well as more 
practical courses on how to give a speech, run a cell meeting, or set up a reading 
hut or wall newspaper. Cadres were schooled on the details of village life and the 
tasks of the Komsomol and Party.110 The courses, like some Komsomol meetings, 
could be long (up to eight hours a day), intense, and boring. In addition to listening 
to lectures, cadre students engaged in discussions about various League matters and 
methods. Cadres were charged with applying and building on this knowledge after 
they arrived at their posts. In reality, the workload of a district or cell secretary left 
little time for further study. As one cadre from Gutovsk district, Novosibirsk, reported, 
“You see, to be engaged in systematic self-education, you won’t have the chance to 
attend meetings and fulfilling my duties in social organization, and even Komsomol 
work itself suffers.”111 A cadre often had to choose between self-improvement and 
practical Komsomol work. Many chose to rely on coercion over the masses because 
the energy, time, and patience needed to exercise persuasion were in short supply.
On July 1, 1926, however, the Komsomol Central Committee drew a hard 
limit on the amount of coercion that cadres could exercise. The TsK sent a memo 
demanding that all lower organizations turn their attention to a letter sent to 
Komsomolskaya Pravda from the town of Korsun. Signed “Svoi,” the letter detailed 
a sex scandal involving a Komsomol cell secretary and district bureau member 
named Romanov. The scandal erupted when locals learned that Romanov had left 
his wife, Sonia Greenberg, and their newborn child for a sixteen-year-old Pioneer 
girl named Kasaeva. According to the letter, Romanov began an affair with Kasaeva 
while serving as her Pioneer troop master. “Svoi” considered Romanov’s liaison as 
an act of “moral murder” against both Greenberg and Kasaeva. Worse yet, “Svoi” 
claimed that other komsomols had taken up Romanov’s “example” and begun trolling 
the Young Pioneers for girls. “And where did our prudence, charter, program and 
discipline go?” “Svoi” asked. “Who would join our ranks now? Who could join such 
[an organization] and what worker would allow his children to join us, if everyone 
disregards prudence? . . . This is not our Komsomol. There must not be sickness in 
our ranks . . . Our ranks must be healthy. We honestly say that we are an upright and 
strong organization and at any moment all this sickness can be excised and create 
a healthy daily life.”112
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The “Romanov Affair” indicated the growing gap between activists and the 
Komsomol masses not only because of the actions involved but also due to the nature 
of the communications that followed. Romanov tried to use his authority to silence 
his accusers, and when that failed, his superiors interfered to protect him, even 
though the majority of cell members had voted for his expulsion. Such negligence 
in dealing with moral and political corruption was compounded by the cadres’ use 
of authority to protect each other. Both factors contributed to the perception that the 
cadres—and by extension the Komsomol and Party—were nothing more than a new 
ruling class that wantonly preyed upon the population with impunity. 
Usually, such matters were dealt with quietly through the Komsomol’s Conflict 
Commission.113 However, amid growing concerns and criticisms of the Komsomol’s 
cadres, the Komsomol press transformed the letter from “Svoi” into a public 
scandal.114 To the rank and file, the “Romanov Affair” signaled that the Komsomol 
leadership was aware of such abuses and would take appropriate action against 
officials like Romanov. To cadres, it was a sign that the Central Committee was 
increasingly intolerant of corruption and abuse of power. In the ensuing months, 
numerous debased activists were connected to Romanov’s name, so much so that a 
phenomenon was declared: Romanovshchina. 
What was this new plague infesting the Komsomol’s ranks? G. Bergman, who 
coined the term, spelled out the Romanov case and the meaning of Romanovshchina 
in two articles in Komsomolskaya pravda, “Untouchable” and “Boomerang,” which 
appeared two weeks apart in July 1926. Both articles were based on the letter from 
“Svoi” and the protocols of cell meetings at the First State Paint Factory during 
Romanov’s expulsion trial. V. Repin, the chairman of the TsK’s Conflict Commission, 
referred to the Romanov case in his report titled “On the struggle with sicknesses,” 
which was published in the journal Young Communist. At the end of the media flurry, 
Romanov and Romanovshchina came to represent the “complete misunderstanding 
on the part of several local organizations of communist ethics and the spirit (dukh) of 
inter-League democracy.” The “crimes” of Romanov and those of his ilk represented 
the ills infecting Komsomol activists as a whole and proved that the leading cadres 
of the organization had truly “separated (otryv) from the masses.”115 But before such 
public unanimity, there had been much obfuscation.
Over the first half of 1926, members of the Komsomol First State Paint Factory 
cell repeatedly attempted to expel Romanov. Their efforts were to no avail, despite 
public outcry and the dramatic appeals by Romanov’s wife that the cell bureau 
should take action against him. As the rank and file quickly learned, Romanov’s 
position as cell secretary and raikom (district committee) member granted him 
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protection from “higher organs.” According to “Svoi,” two raikom secretaries named 
Staliniskii and Kaniuka stood by Romanov and used their power to intimidate cell 
members. Without their backing, Romanov’s theatrics would have certainly gotten 
him expelled. As “Svoi” explained it, Stalinskii and Kaniuka subverted any attempt 
to expel Romanov: they stood before the cell and argued that Romanov’s personal 
life had no bearing on his standing as a good Komsomol. They went on to claim 
that the charges were overblown and that he had committed forgivable mistakes. 
After all, they contended, if “Trotsky could be mistaken, then why not Romanov?” 
They added, “there is nothing to be afraid of and if he made a little mistake, then 
so what, who hasn’t made mistakes?” Kaniuka declared, “Romanov went with a 
Pioneer-komsomolka who was already 16 years old. She could already get legally 
married. Therefore Romanov did not commit any crime.” Stalinskii replied, “True, 
[Romanov] held an incorrect line toward the pioneer organization. He undermined 
the authority of the cell. But this is in no way a crime. You can’t expel him from 
the Komsomol for this, but you should give him a strong reprimand and put it in 
his personal file.”
 When cell members challenged the raikom secretaries, Stalinskii and Kaniuka 
turned to more forceful tactics. They “berated the komsomols for engaging in such 
nonsense” and accused the cell of spying because it had been keeping track of 
“whose house [Romanov] visits” and spreading “such gossip.” They also warned, 
“if anyone said anything more about Romanov, they would be expelled from the 
Komsomol.” Romanov, they maintained, “would never be expelled” because he was 
a good activist and raikom member. “Without his work you would have nothing,” 
they scolded. Objections to Romanov’s behavior were branded part of a political 
campaign by “squabblers” to disrupt the organization. 
Romanov also exercised his own authority to protect his position. At first, 
he trotted out the oft-played assertion that “it wasn’t the Komsomol’s place to 
interfere in his personal life,” adding, “If I want two wives, then it is my business.” 
He even justified his actions by claiming that his wife possessed a “meshchanka’s 
psychology.”116 Communist ethics repeatedly urged men to avoid entangling 
themselves with the morally corrupt and politically suspect “meshchanka.” When 
his twisting of Komsomol logic proved unconvincing, Romanov abruptly ended the 
meeting, but not before pummeling the cell’s members with profanity and threatening 
to expel anyone who brought up the issue again. As “Svoi” recounted, “Everyone 
fell silent when the cell bureau heard such authoritative words from a cell secretary 
and a raikom bureau member.” 
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After Romanov had lost reelection and was no longer the cell secretary (but still 
remained in the bureau), he changed his tune. At a later meeting, “Svoi” reported, 
“The bureau couldn’t do anything because Romanov began to put on some kind of 
act. He began crying and screaming that he would shoot himself if he were expelled. 
The bureau was afraid.” To many, Romanov’s conduct proved his dubious character. 
“When Romanov was ‘in power,’” wrote G. Bergman, “he terrorized the masses and 
used his position for self-defense; now he changed his tune and became hysterical.”117
Romanov’s pressure (zazhim) against criticism from the rank and file constituted 
a violation of League democracy. Komsomol internal democracy assured the general 
membership a check against authority if officials violated Komsomol ethics and 
political doctrine. If an activist violated the consensus of the cell majority (as long 
as that consensus was within the confines of Komsomol’s political line), he was 
duty bound to accept the cell’s judgment. 
Armed with the letter from “Svoi,” G. Bergman lambasted Romanov and his 
protectors in the pages of Komsomolskaya pravda. For Bergman, the issue was 
not so much Romanov’s sexual escapades but rather the attempts to whitewash 
them. “What is the special meaning of the [Romanov] case? The bureau “cannot” 
in any way deal with one of its scoundrels (prokhvost). The entire cell is pressured 
first with intimidation then cajoled by rhetoricians from the raikom. They bent 
over backwards to defend an ‘irreplaceable worker’ in front of the worker masses. 
The special meaning of Romanovshchina is in the gross violation of inter-League 
democracy, repression [of the voice of rank and file], and the division of activists 
from the masses.”118 
The members of the Kurson raikom were not going to remain silent in the face 
of Bergman’s accusations. In response to the article “Untouchable,” the raikom sent 
a collective letter saying that Bergman’s narrative was “inaccurate to the core” and 
“did not correspond to the real state of things in the Kurson organization.” There was 
no “coercion” exerted upon the rank and file or any “separation from the masses” 
whatsoever. Raikom members tried to prove this by referring to the last cell bureau 
elections, in which over half of those elected were freshmen activists. Bergman 
responded by citing statements from meeting protocols, such as these two statements 
from the rank and file interspersed with Bergman’s interjections: 
Marchekhovskii: The question of Romanov had already stood before the cell 
a second and third time. When Romanov was secretary he said that no one 
had the right to interfere in his personal life, and that he’d punch in the mouth 
anyone who carried on or talked about him and closed the meeting (this is not 
coercion?—G. B.). My suggestion: expel Romanov from the Komsomol for 
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the corruption of the Pioneers and un-Komsomol behavior.
Sventsitskii: Comrade Romanov undermined the authority of our cell. Raikom 
secretary Stalinskii prevented discussion of this question at the meeting (This is 
not coercion? G. B.), and because of this, the question remains uninvestigated. 
This issue has once again come to light. Such a komsomol must be expelled 
from our ranks.
Bergman cited other rank-and-file members who described how Romanov’s 
behavior caused parents “to curse and beat” their children for joining the Pioneers 
and how komsomols such as Romanov needed to be “driven out of the organization.” 
For Bergman, these testimonies exemplified the crisis of Komsomol democracy.
As if the attempts by Romanov, Stalinskii, and Kaniuka to silence the rank 
and file were not enough, the three raikom members went even further in their own 
efforts to protect the position of the officials (as separate from the position of the 
general membership). They claimed that the attacks on Romanov were perpetrated 
by cell members who “engage in squabbles against Romanov and other comrades.” 
Another defender, Mnishchenko, claimed, “there were no facts” to support the 
charges against Romanov. The most forceful exclamation came from a raikom 
member named Radchenko: “We must get to the bottom of this “Romanovshchina” 
[and] the instigators appear to be Kagan and Marchkhovskii. . . . We will give an 
answer to [Bergman’s] article, and now investigate the group which engages in 
squabbling in the cell . . . Romanov, as a worker, cannot be intimidated with philistine 
(meshchankii) bourgeois degenerates.
The Korsun raikom’s defense amounted to nothing. Bergman’s articles were 
enough to force the hand of the Central Committee’s Conflict Commission, which 
took the unprecedented step of publishing its verdict in Komsomolskaya pravda. 
Romanov was expelled from the Komsomol for “gross violation of Komsomol ethics 
and the violation of the principles of inter-League democracy.” But the TsK’s verdict 
went further. It concluded that the Romanov case disclosed “abnormalities” in the 
Kurson organization and called for the Ukrainian TsK to conduct a full investigation. 
What came of that investigation remains unknown.119
The Romanov case encapsulates, in many ways, the themes of this article. 
Putting aside Romanov’s dubious character, cadres like him were, in many ways, 
“irreplaceable workers.” They shouldered much of work and received little 
compensation for doing so. The rank and file was often apathetic to cadres’ efforts, 
and frequently indifferent to Komsomol politics and activities. Cadres were left 
with few tools to actuate participation from below in order to fulfill the many tasks 
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and responsibilities raining on them from above. These realities often rendered it 
more expedient for cadres to rely on domination. Thus, Romanov’s behavior and his 
comrades’ protection were not the main factors that separated them from the masses. 
Rather, these actions only served to push the status quo into an intolerable stage. 
The growing division between cadres and the rank and file was truly a reflection of 
the inability of the Komsomol and, by extension, the Soviet state, to establish and 
maintain authority rooted in consent. 
As Nikolai Chaplin stated, Komsomol cadres were a “special element” within 
the Komsomol. Though he did not intend it, the two words that make up this 
designation spoke directly to cadres’ experience. They were “special” because they 
had power and responsibilities as local leaders. They were charged with implementing 
directives, maintaining and carrying out work in their organizations, and representing 
the regime. But cadres were also supposed to be attentive to their local members, 
advance their interests, and lead by example. However, being “special” came at a 
price. Life as a local leader was hardly glamorous and often unrewarding. While 
Komsomol cadres committed themselves to League work out of dedication to 
ideals, personal development, or career advancement, these potential benefits rarely 
materialized as fully or as quickly as they had hoped. Cadres were often caught in 
the moral pincers of their superiors and their subordinates, subject to harsh working 
and living conditions, and disappointed by how hoped-for benefits of a cadre position 
were frequently pushed into the future. 
In fact, it was the stress and strain of a downtrodden and tedious that became 
the “special” distinguishing mark of a cadre. United by common experience, cadres 
increasingly regarded themselves as a distinct layer that exercised influence and, 
when necessary, closed ranks to protect each other from attempts to dilute their 
scrap of power and privilege. Despite their internal fractiousness, discord, and 
competition, cadres could at times act as a corporate body when under threat. As 
the Romanov case showed, cadre solidarity could prove a potent force at the local 
level and often easily navigate the floods of hostile local public opinion. Cadres’ 
corporate power was rooted in their ability to dominate their subordinates. Only the 
Central Committee had the real authority to break it.
Yet cadres’ efforts to maintain their position through domination contradicted 
their function as the mediation between the center and periphery within the League 
and the Soviet system writ large. Cadres were on the front lines of Soviet power, 
making their relations with the rank and file and the communities that they inhabited 
a reflection of that power. However, the conditions in which a cadre found himself 
were hardly conducive to building consent. It was often more practical to simply 
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browbeat one’s subordinates into submission or simply exclude them from the 
process entirely. 
Komsomol cadres’ reliance on coercion certainly speaks to governing practices 
that would become indicative of the Stalinist years. And while connections can be 
made to the 1930s, the methods Komsomol cadres used to govern their members 
relays something more about the nature of Bolshevik power in the 1920s. It reaffirms 
the fact that the Bolshevik state was weak, and that its hold over the country was 
fragile and even tenuous. Moreover, the tendency toward force rather than consent 
signifies how Russia’s rulers had few mechanisms at their disposal for instituting the 
soviet system. The story of the Komsomol’s cadres suggests that the Bolsheviks and 
their adherents operated as an alien force against the population. This foreignness 
would become even starker with collectivization, a campaign Lynne Viola aptly 
called, “nothing less than the internal colonization of the peasantry.”120
Thus, in the end, Komsomol cadres represented a distinct alien element 
reinforced by their common experience. The everyday life of a Komsomol cadre 
was at best bittersweet, and at times wholly tragic. Their positions could command 
authority, a few perks, and even respect, but the costs could erode the benefits to 
insignificance. If they serve as even a minute example of the human quality and daily 
challenges of local Komsomol leaders, it is no wonder that the League leadership’s 
efforts to seize its cadre network proved so elusive throughout the 1920s.
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